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Prior to 1948 the Congress Youth League (CYL) consciously kept Its
official membership small. It hoped to radicalise the ANC through
internal pressure group politics. Around 1948, a definite shift
... occurred in CYL thinking. The leadership of the CYL began to
realise that they needed more signed up members in order to become
a more effective Internal pressure group. The CYL needed a large
bloc; of voters at the ANC's annual national conferences at which
ANC policy was determined. Thus the CYL commenced a vigorous
recruitment drive In 1948 . (1) A series of new CY1 branches were
established as part of an attempt to push through the Programme of
Action at the 1949 Bloemfontein Congress . (2) From 1948 onwards,
then,i the CYL redefined Itself as a mass youth movement. Once the
• CYL ,effectlvely seized control of the ANC in 1949 and many of Its
leaders took up leadership positions In the senior body, the
organisation lost coherence. The CYL's role as a pressure group
became redundant. The CYL continued to operate more as a youth
recruitment wing of the ANC than as a distinctive organisation.
Although the CYL lost Its dlstlnctiveness within the ANC, It
continued to prioritize recruitment and It continued to emphasize
branch level organistion. In fact, the CYL tried to assert its
•distinctlveness precisely through becoming the most dynamic
organising and recruiting section of the ANC. (3)
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 Most . Informed observers of the Youth League today recognise that
the organisation operated within a fairly narrow social framework,
that it was not particularly successful In establishing a genuine
mass base amongst the youth. (4) My paper reinforces this
Impression. The phenomenon has never been adequately explained by
historians. Some Marxists, as a kind of reflex response, argue
that the Youth League was essentially a petty bourgeoise
organisation representing the interests, "and sensitive to the
grievances, of the African elite.. The CYL could therefore only
establish a support base amongst the African petty bourgeoisie.
This explanation has some broad descriptive utility but it fails' to
. answer at least two questions. First,-how do we overcome the
age-old problem of finding a cut-off point between the petty
bourgeoisie and the working class? This becomes an especially
thorny problem in this particular geographical and historical
context, since the African petty bourgeoisie arid African working
class tended to experience broadly similar standards of living in
the Rand locations. Second, how do we explain the CYL's following
amongst at least some sections of the working class? In order to.
provide an answer to these questions, I have found It necessary to
go beyond class analysis, to make a detailed study of the personal
and institutional networks in which the CYL operated; .< ••'' •
Class analysis does not really provide an explanation of the
divisions which existed among the urban African youth on the Rand
In the late 40s and the 50s. I argue that the African youth were
divided Into two distinct worlds. On the one hand, there was the
Christian-literate constituency which was generally school-going.
On the other hand, there was the semi-literate^ youth gang
constituency which generally rejected schooling. The latter
constituency was substantially larger than the former. The edges
of these categories were often blurred. Many youths passed from
one world into the other, while some managed to live in both
simultaneously. But the worlds were, on the whole, clearly
distinguishable from one another and crossed class lines. The CYL,
I argue, because of Its Institutional connections and
IntellectualIsm, operated almost entirely within the
Christian-literate, school-going world.
The CYL leadership was drawn from the elite of African urban
society. Youth Leaguers recognised the need for mass mobilisation
and militant, extra-constitutional politics in the struggle against
a racist political order. The CYL also made frequent use of
traditional African symbols. However, Youth Leaguers, like the
senior ANC leadership, accepted western values almost entirely.
Gefhart emphasises this aspect of the national democratic movement
in the 1950s.
Neither the elite's new-found community of interest
with lower class Africans nor the resentment of
Afrikaner cruelty altered a fundamental
psychological feature of the African predicament
... all standards of achievement, status, and worth
in South Africa were standards imposed or inherited
from the dominant society of whites ... for almost
any African who had given up traditional ways in
favour of a modern life-style, self-esteem was
inextricably bound up with the successful
acquisition of white culture - in every aspect from
material possessions and occupational skills
through forms of etiquette and leisure pastimes.
Much or all of the prestige accorded to well
educated or wealthy Africans by their communities
was recognition of their success In becoming "like
whites'. (5)
It Is not surprising, therefore, that the CYL failed to regard the
youth gangs, which detached themselves completely from western
values, as a potential political constituency. Although Individual
tsotsis were occasionally approached by the CYL, Youth Leaguers
generally regarded youth gangs as beyond the pale.
In the first section of this paper I will briefly examine the CYL's
established organisational networks during the late 1940s and 50s.
In the second section I will move to a more grassroots perspective
in attempting to create a picture of the African youth constituency
on the Rand in the 1940s and 50s. Finally, I will assess the
extent to which the CYL, as the wing of the national liberation
movement most concerned with African youth, penetrated the African
youth constituency organisationally.
High school students were the youth League's key constituency. (6)
Young educated Africans looking forward to widening their stake in
a future South Africa provided an obvious recruiting ground for the
CYL.
Many of the original Youth Leaguers first became politicised as
school students. Lembede, Mda, Mbata, William Nkomo and Raboroko
were all prominent in the Transvaal Student Association (TSA) prior
to the formation of the CYL. (7) 'So we could say that products of
the students organisations became the nucleus for organisations
like the Youth League. . ." (8) The TSA was not an overtly
political body In the 30s and 40s. It was more of a "social*
organisation than a "political" one. (9) Nevertheless, a great
deal of political discussion took place within the TSA and It is
likely that the political ideas of Lembede, Mda and their
' - • • • . • \
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colleagues were formulated In this grouping. The Youth Leaguers \
must have been particularly familiar with the mood and Internal
workings of student associations and schools. It was an
environment In which they ,felt comfortable. Moreover, they
understood that students were highly receptive to politlcisation.
The CYL used this familiar network to reproduce Itself: most of the
•second generation" CYL activists who operated In the 50s were
Influenced by, and Incorporated into, the CYL while attending
school.
Students on the Rand, and particularly In Orlando, were heavily
Influenced by the Youth League. The CYL staged numerous meetings
on the Rand during the 1940s which were well attended by students.
(10) Godfrey Pitje, leader of the CYL in 1949 and 1950, recalls
the high level of politiclsation amongst school children when he
taught at Orlando High in 1945.
One of the things which struck me was the
advancement of the average student politically
compared to us on the staff ... I didn't realise it
then, but I know now, that It was because they were
under the Influence of the Youth League. They were
attending meetings by the likes of Lembede, A.P.
Mda, Oliver Tambo, Mandela, Slsulu ... (11)
Es'kla Mphahlele's recollection of his teaching on the Rand in the
40s confirms this impression of Pitje's. When Mphahlele was
teaching In the 40s a number of senior students "were very much
Interested in the Youth League and were talking about it in class".
(12) He recalls that one senior student got up in class to
announce the death of Anton Lembede in 1947. Lembede was highly
praised and there was great interest in the classroom. (13)
Teachers formed an Important component of the CYL in the Transvaal.
This Is not to suggest that most of the teachers on the Rand were
Youth Leaguers or even Youth League sympathisers. In fact,
teachers were a largely a-political constituency. Nevertheless, a
number of prominent Leaguers were teachers at one stage or another.
Tambo and Pitje were teachers before they became lawyers, Sobukwe,
Mothopeng and Mphahlele were all teachers on the Rand during the
50s. These teachers used their profession as a platform for
politicising their students, despite their vulnerability as
employees of the Transvaal Education Department.
Teachers with strong Youth League connections such as Sobukwe,
Tambo and pitje were very influential in their classrooms. (14)
Sobukwe, in 1949, invited Ntatho Motlana, who was an active CYL
organiser at the time, to come and speak to his students at his
school in Standerton. Sobukwe took many risks to politicise his
students and he became "a tremendous influence in his area". (15)
"We did things then which teachers could never get away with
today", comments Pitje. (16) During his brief teaching spell on
the Rand in 1950, Pitje made an effort to "revive the spirit of
African culture" in his classroom. He would instil in his students
a love of the "traditional ways of doing things". He would tell
them about a proud African history and call them by their
traditional African names rather than their Christian names.
Students perceived Pitje as different from the other teachers and
they became "very receptive" to his kind of teaching. Pitje
rejected subservience to "Western ways". He recalls that instead
of praying In the traditional Christian way, he would praise
African historical leaders. At assembly prayers, Pltje would put
his fist in the air and pray to "The God of Chaka, the God of
Sekhukhune*. . Students were Initially surprised by this behaviour
but, ultimately, accepted it warmly. (17)
When Duma Nokwe and Kathrada returned from their visit to China,
Pltje organised for his senior pupils to go and speak to Nokwe at a
meeting where "they spoke freely about Mao Tse Tung". Pltje was
also able to introduce ANC slogans to the school such as
"Mayibuyel" and "Africa to the Africans!". Pltje refused to be
obsequious towards white officials. He treated them as equals, to
the great delight of his students. Pitje recalls:
... when "a white Inspector came to my school,
instead of cringing like the average principle, the
average teacher ... I [would act] as naturally as I
could ... And the students loved this, they
hero-worshipped us for doing this kind of thing ...
Mothopeng was hero-worshipped at Orlando High. (18)
The . CYL often used teachers to penetrate the schools. It would
"find, sympathy with one or two members of the staff and in that way
build [its] base". (19) Teachers were generally a-polltlcal in the
40s and 50s but there was usually a small core of politicised,
CYL-sympathetlc teachers at every school on the Rand. At
Mphahlele's school, Orlando High, four teachers out of a staff of
35 were politicised, two of which belonged to the Youth League.
(20) At other schools on the Wltwatersrand, there was also "always
a small minority of teachers who were politically vocal and
politically conscious and talked politics in the staffroom". But
the small group of politicised teachers were highly Influential
amongst the students. (21) Thus, teachers were able to expose
students to a new Ideology and popularize organisations such as the
CYL and ANC. Through school students the CYL was also able to have
some wider impact on the rest of the community. "The students',
comments Pitje, "... were well placed in the community to sow the
seeds of this new political solution [African Nationalism]". (22)
Although the teacher-pupil interaction was important, the CYL did
most of its organising amongst school students outside of the
school environment. School authorities were consistently hostile
to any form of political penetration. Students, teachers and
outsiders involved In politics could be victimised or removed with
ease. 'Political techers" had to tread very cautiously. (23)
Student Representative Councils were non-exlstant on the Rand in
the 40s and 50s. (24)
For Motlana, student associations provided the most useful avenue
for making contact with school students. Because of the hostility
of the school environment, Motlana would do most of his organising
through student associations during the holidays. According to
Motlana this was the most common method of organising for Youth
League activists. (25) Motlana's "beat* was on the East Rand,
stretching from Germiston to Nigel. He would go around forming
little pockets of CYL supporters and then try to get them to
establish an autonomous branch which could then expand Itself and
spread the programme and Ideology of the CYL. 1950 - 1952,
according to Motlana, was a period of great activity for Youth
League branch level activists. Once a core group of around ten new
activists had been established they were considered large enough to
set up a new branch. This would involve electing their own
secretary and treasurer and acting autonomously from other
branches. (26)
. ~ Another method of spreading CYL influence in the schools was
through pamphleteering. This was safer than personal organising as
pamphlets could be left around the schools anonymously. In May
.1948 'a series of letters were written to Umtetell Wa Bantu around
the issue of pamphleteering and politicizing in the schools. One
letter writer, H.M. Nthaka, a teacher from Sharpevllle, criticized
those who complained about political pamphleteering at Arican
schools. Nthaka argued that it was a completely acceptable
practice since children were constantly exposed to state propaganda
at the schools. (27) Other more respectable parents complained
about : the political influences on their children in what ought to
have been an a-political institution.
The CYL, then, had several ways of influencing school students and
establishing new branches amongst them. Individual politicized
,teachers were influential In the classroom, hundreds of students
. were attracted to the mass meetings conducted by high profile CYL
leaders; most importantly, branches were set up through links with
student associations.
The only coherent constituency of the Youth League was school
students. Apart from schools, the CYL's only significant area of
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operation was Fort Hare University. The Youth League established,
at best, personalised, ad hoc. relations with church groups," ••
professional associations and local community movements. The CYL
was unadventurous and. unimaginative 'in building' links with • ••
potential constituencies. , It organised within ) the section of
society it knew best, the section from which the CYL leadership
Itself emerged. During 'the 1950s, the CYL failed to explore new
avenues of potential mobilisation amongst the youth, -instead,' it
spent most of Its energy on popularising AHC campaigns.* To the
extent that it did Organise youth, it continued to operate almost
entirely amongst school students. -.. '• . - .• ' . ' , :
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High school students represented by.no means the majority of urban
African youths on the Rand. (By "youths, I refer to those aged
roughly between 14 and 21). Most students dropped out of school at
an early age, while thousands never attended school at all. (29)
Schooling was not compulsory in the 1940s and 1950s, nor was it
affordable for the vast majority of urban African,families. (30)
Schooling was a luxury. Nevertheless, amongst the Christianised
elements, schooling was 'virtually compulsory". (31) Most
Christian parents, whether petty bourgeois or working class,
revered western-style education and sent their children to school
at all costs. Numerous . non-Chrlstlan parents also-prloritlsed
education. But parents did not always have sufficient control over
their children to ensure their attendance at school. (32)
Schooling, especially amongst the non-Christian elements, was far
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from an accepted way of life for African youths". Even those youths
• who ' did undergo a substantial amount of schooling found it
extremely difficult to find employment afterwards. A huge section
of the unemployed and non-schoolgoing youths drifted into youth
gangs. "By the early 1950s the culture of youth gangs was one of
the strongest currents running through the locations". (33)
•• •
' fhe-Roots of Tsbtsl Culture
Three factors contributed to the prevalence of youth gajigs on the
Rand' : low levels of school attendance amongst urban youth, massive
• unemployment and the instability of family life. All three factors
.require some elaboration:
i!v7.-.-.-v ,,
In the year 1949 only 6533 African children attended secondary
school in Pretoria and on the Rand. (34) I have no comparative
figures for the 1950s. However, it is likely, that this figure
remained fairly stable throughout the decade. The total union
secondary school attendance figure in 1949 was 46 314 (35) By
\ i
1960 the union total had actually decreased slightly to 45 598
/
(36).° Unless Pretoria and Rand school attendance patterns were
drastically different from those of the rest of the Union, it Is
safe to assume that African secondary school attendance on the Rand
arid •: in Pretoria remained below 7000 throughout the 1950s.
Schoolgoers, then, represented an extremely small proportion of the
African urban population aged between 14 and 20. Attendance at
junior and primary schools was much greater. Roughly 10% of
African scholars were high school students. (37) School attendance
dropped off rapidly in each progressive year of schooling. On the
• . . ' . : 1 2 • • ' • ' • • • j
Rand and In Pretoria In 1949 there were!i8 478 Sub.A pupils, 10 899
Sub B pupils, down to. 3. •770 Standard .V .pupils.. There were onl,y 820
Standard VII pupils and 63 matriculants. (38) .,
There were -three basic reasons for low school attendance and'early
school leaving. First, schooling was not compulsory and there were
far too few schools to accommodate even those children who did want
.„• to attend school. (39) Second, the quality of education was low.
Children rejected Inferior, unstlmulatlng schooling. The de
Vllllers Louw Commission' of 1950 recognised this. The standard of
schooling was so bad, 'the commission complained,•that children .
preferred to join youth gangs: (40) ..Moreover,: schooling was.
•'•/ Impractical. A school .education did not necessarily Improve a^
school-leaver's employment opportunities. The ' de Vllllers Louw
/
Commission recognised this too. The commission recommended that
schooling should provide skills more Immediately necessary to the
economy. Children would, then be employable once *hey left/school
and they would recognise the value of attending-school. (41)
Third, most urban African families could not afrford to send their
children to school. Children were pressurized ifrom an early age
• • " i
V /
Into becoming economically active. Parents often preferred to have
their children contributing to the famllyVIncome rather than •
wasting their time at school. .Thus "children were either rejecting
schooling as useless, or were compelled by economic necessity to
find work".. (42)
A Native Youth Board Investigation In 1950 estimated
•conservatively" that the'number of unemployed youths of employable
13
age (14-20 years) In the Johannesburg area was over 20 000. This
apparently amounted to almost 80% of Johannesburg's African
Juvenile population In 1950. (43) In a thesis written In 1952,
W.J., Kleser, a Principal of . Dlepkloof Reformatory In the 1950s,
computed that there were "about 120 000 Native children of
school-going age Idling away their days In the streets or standing
aimlessly about the locations of the City and the Reef'. (44)
Probably the most Important reason for urban youth unemployment was
the competition urban youths faced from migrants on the job market.
.Employers on the Rand, despite Influx control legislation,
• preferred to employ migrants rather than local youths. Migrants
tended to be more acquiescent, "respectful" and reliable than their
urban counterparts. Furthermore, they were prepared to accept
lower wages. Employers of both Industrial and domestic labour
tended to feel this way. (45) In an official letter to the
Johannesburg Regional Employment Commissioner, W.J.P. Carr,
Johannesburg's Manager of Native Affairs, wrote In 1955:
Native juveniles who are urbanised, are often
unreliable, work-shy and selective in their choice
of a job - many prefer to exist by gambling and
other nefarious means, and make little or no
contribution to the maintenance of their families.
... Employers because of these facts, are
unwilling to employ native juveniles. (46)
In
 ; another letter in 1956, Carr reiterated that urban African
youths "tend to be unreliable, work-shy, aggressive and
unco-operative when offered employment". (47) There was clearly
some truth In these allegations but the unemployment problem was
exacerbated by these very Impressions of the employers.. Employers
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were usually prejudiced towards urban youths and unwilling to give
them a chance. (48) Employers often by-passed locai labour bureaux
and employed directly through contacts In the countryside. In
Vereenlglng, for Instance, Industrialists built up a relationship
with groups of migrants from a particular rural district and
employed freely from this pool. (49) Throughout the 1940s and'
early 1950s municipal authorities throughout the POT generally
turned a blind eye to these breaches of Influx control In order to
avoid discouraging local' Industry. (50) Domestic employers, like
Industrialists, preferred to employ rural workseekers, • thus
restricting the chief avenue of employment open to female urban
youths. (51) Urban youths found It • virtually impossible- to
penetrate the Industrial and domestTc"'' laSour" market' T n " any'
significant way. The greater the Influx of rural work-seekers, the
smaller was the potential job market for urban youths.
There were two other practical considerations ; for employers.
First, urban youths tended to have less stamina than their rural
counterparts. There was a high level of malnutrition in the
African locations which physically weakened children and juveniles;
Furthermore, they had very little experience of hard physical work.
(52) Second, the Wage Board fixed wage levels for juveniles.
Industrialists might have been more amenable to employing urban
youths If they could have paid them wages below the levels fixed by-
the Wage Board. Since wages were fixed, employers were determined
to find the most productive possible workers. (53)
The attitude of urban youths towards employment was Influenced by
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youth gang culture. Tsotsl culture rejected discipline, hard work
and "respectable" employment. Moreover, youth gangs provided an
alternative means of survival for urban youths. The need to find
employment was therefore less urgent. (54) Unemployment and youth
gang culture mutually reinforced one another. Unemployment was a
far more conceivable option for urban youths with the existence of
youth gangs. Simultaneously, unemployment swelled the ranks of the
tsotsl gangs. The Vtljoen Report of 1951 noted a direct causal
link between unemployment and the prevalence of tsotsl gangs.
"Juveniles out of employment develop spontaneously into Tsotsis In
order/ to find an outlet for their energies as well as a means of
earning a livelihood by Illegal means". (55) The phenomenon of
early: school leaving also swelled the ranks of youth gangs. Not
only, did it add pressure to the unemployment problem but It ensured
that young children came Into daily contact with "undesirable
types". Moreover, children were more susceptible to tsotsl
Influences when they were no longer subjected to the disciplinary
effects of the school environment. (56)
• - /
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s urban African families were
tremendously unstable. Several factors contributed to this.
First, African workers were generally unskilled which ensured a
high, job turnover. Workers were constantly on the move, looking
for new or better-paid jobs. Second, the migrant labour system and
the implementation of pass laws often broke up family units.
Third, there was a disproportionately large population of males In
relation to females.
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Relationships, then, were often casual and children rarely
experienced a stable family environment. The rate of illegitimacy
was extremely high throughout the Rand. The Vlljoen Report
expressed concern about the effects of illegitimacy on children:
It would seem that the majority of Native children
born in the urban areas are illegitimate, a potent
force undermining parental control and weakening
the disciplinary forces which are so necessary to
the maintenance of a stable society. (57)
Illegitimacy Itself, however, was not necessarily the problem. "
Officially consecrated marriages were often as unstable" as casual
unions. Conversely, informal unions occasionally led to fairly
stable families. (58) Technical legitimacy was less important than^
family stability In so far as it ' effected'"children":'"Loca'tlon "'
children, whether legitimate or Illegitimate, were largely free
from parental controls. Parents, even. if. they retained a
commitment to their children, were usually at work all. day. ' The'
Viljoen Report pointed out that there was also an absence of tribal
youth control mechanisms which both kept youth "in their place" and
imbued them with a sense of social responslbllty. (59) Tsotsl
culture was boosted by the lack of parental attendance and
guidance. As Bonner puts it: 'For a significant proportion of
[urban youth] the normal socialising and disciplinary agencies were
either atrophied or absent ... Into this,moral void stepped the
gangs". (60) , . ' - . . - . '
Tsotsl Culture . ' .
By the early 1950s, African locations on the Rand were' riddled with
tsotsi gangs which earned a livelihood through criminal activities.
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They emerged during the 1940s In the old free-hold townships of
Sophlatown, Newclare and Alexandra. The phenomenon rapidly spread !
to other townships. During the 1950s practically every African ;
township on the Rand was terrorised by local tsotsl gangs. (61)
There were several large and famous gangs such as the Americans of ;
Sophlatown, the Berllners of Newclare, the Spoilers of Alexandra
and the Torch Gang of Orlando. But most of the gangs were small
splinter gangs. In Orlando, there were apparently small 'peer
group" gangs on practically every street corner. (62) In Alexandra
alone there were six major gangs with a combined membership of over ;
500 youths, as well as numerous small gangs. (63) Most gangs were |
locally based but at least two, The Spoilers and the Americans, had j
•branches" In other townships. "The Spoilers", observed Freed In
1958, "are a widespread gang with branches In locations like ;
• • • . . . . . !
Plmvllle, George Goch and Vrededorp. The branches come together
when there Is a serious threat from another gang*. (64) A group
called the Young Americans emerged In Alexandra which had strong
connections with the Sophiatown Americans. The Sophlatown
Americans often sent carloads of people to Alexandra to assist the
Young Americans when they were In "tricky spots". (65) Some of the
bigger gangs had differentiated age "regiments" which carried out
specific functions. (66) Members of gangs had a stong sense of
Identity. In all the gangs there tended to be "an awareness of
leadership, a strong man, a man who gave the orders ..." (67)
Youths had to prove their loyalty before becoming full members of
gangs. They were first drawn Into the gangs' patronage networks
and .gradually Initiated. The de Vllllers Louw Commission showed an
awareness of this:
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The 'tsotsi' organisation has found a fertile field
in the urban areas. Youths are Initiated in stages
to become eventually members of criminal gangs who
rob and steal for a living under the guidance of an
experienced leader. (68)
The Vlljoen Report of 1951 explained the term "tsotsl" as follows:
Tsotsls are gangs of Native juveniles, the members
of which are predominantly unemployed and are
characterised by the fact that they wear the same
distinctive clothing, make use of the same secret
language, have strong group consciousness, and live
largely by Illegal means.. (69)
Tsotsl gangs "developed a distinct counter-culture". (70.) They
rejected schooling, parental authority and "western civilized
values". Mr M. Thlakula, the principle of an African high school
in Springs, described the average tsotsl gang In his area:
The group consists of boys ranging from 15 years to
20 and more, and their chief characteristic Is
their refusal to work for a living. Even In their
own homes they refuse to take part In any ordinary
family activities except eating.
In order to get pocket money they gamble and pick
the pockets of their own people by night and those
of European shoppers during the busy hours of the
day. From their class come the future criminals.
(71)
The gangs, then, developed their own distinctive leisure time
activities, social norms, hierarchies, language and means of
subsistance.
Gang culture was Influenced by cowboy and gangster films. Tsotsls
spent a great deal of their time loitering around their local
cinemas. They often fought other gangs to establish territorial
rights over cinemas. Movie Images deeply Influenced their style
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and behaviour. (72)
Tsotsts were distinctly antl-soclal. They rejected all forms of
authority and parental control. The de Vllllers Louw Commission
grumbled that "they thrive on disorderllness and are famed creators
of d.isorder". (73) In 1956, W.J.P. Carr commented: "... tsotsl
gangs. ... flout authority and frustrate the efforts of parents and
advisory board members In their attempts to rehabilitate the
youths'. (74) But the tsotsls did not threaten the authorities
alone. By the late 1940s tsotsls preyed on their own communities.
(75) , According to Mphahlele, "they really threatened the whole
fabric of society, wherever they were, wherever they lived ... At
night time people always wanted to be in their houses before dark".
(76) They molested people In the streets and mugged people In
trains and trams throughout the Rand. They showed little concern
whether their victims were whites or Africans, rich or poor. Freed
created a hair-raising picture of rapes, murders and robberies
carried out by tsotsls in African locations. (77) Motlana
confirms that the tsotsls formed an "underprivileged under class
which really preyed on their own people". (78) Gangs also preyed
on each other. Inter gang warfare was common. They fought and
competed amongst each other over women and "territory". Gambling
often sparked off Inter gang violence. (79) Most frequently, they
fought over crime monopolies. For Instance, they would fight for
exclusive rights to rob from a certain section of domestic servants
or visitors who would enter the locations on the weekends. (80)
It is possible that some gangs were more scrupulous about their
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victims than others. Motlana, for Instance, has rather fond
memories of the Americans. Motlana, who lived In Sophlatown from
1949 until the mid 1950s, recalls that the Americans 'never robbed
from blacks, they always robbed whites and for that reason they
became very well respected In Sophlatown". The Americans did not
consider themselves to be criminals, they simply 'liberated goods'.
(81) This view Is largely borne out by the 1954 Drum focus on the
Americans. Apart from Inter gang violence, their activities seemed
to be directed at white-owned or state-owned property. (82) But,
If this Is true, the Americans were very much the exception.
Hotlana draws a sharp distinction between the Americans and other
'criminal elements". He himself warns against romanticizing
tsotsls. (83)
Community and State Responses to Tsotsl Culture
. £rom around the middle of the 1940s, conservative, literate older
generation Africans became increasingly aware of, and concerned
about, the problem of juvenile delinquency. This Is reflected In
the columns of Omtetell Wa Bantu. Pmtetell, though an
African-run newspaper, was financed by the Chamber of Mines. Its
staff and readership represented, In the eyes of the white
establishment, the most respectable elements of African society.
These Africans were highly literate, politically conservative and
deeply imbued with Christian values. Between 1945 and 1948 a
steady stream of articles, editorials and letters appeared In
Umtetell focussing on the question of juvenile delinquency.
Contributors were occasionally sympathetic towards delinquents,
blaming social conditions rather than the youths themselves. (84)
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An editorial In 1945 was completely unconclllatory:
. ..' To put It bluntly, despite the efforts of parents,
ministers of religion, teachers and welfare
organisations there is growing up at an alarming
rate a population of criminal loafers who are not
. . only a menace to the community, both African and
European, but constitute a tragic waste of human
- ability and manpower.
The editorial went on to praise a proposal of the Johannesburg City
Council to place "idle" delinquents into regimented units which
would carry out various municipal services.
Briefly the schemes envisage the collection of
youths into semi-military units - one might with
truth compare them with the groups of young men
which existed when the tribal organisation was at
Its peak. once in these units they would be
disciplined, properly fed, educated and trained for
useful work. (85)
The educated conservative Christian elements of urban African
society were not alone in their concern about juvenile delinquency.
Crime was a major issue in the locations throughout the 1940s and
1950s. From the mid 1940s onwards tsotsis were identified as the
most prevalent and dangerous criminals. The Orlando advisory
board, which consulted fairly widely on a local level, identified
crime as an important township issue. Crime was discussed widely
in advisory board meetings and public platforms from around 1945
until the late 50s. (86) In October 1955 a special meeting between
the Non-European Affairs department and the Joint Native Advisory
Board of the Rand area was called specifically to discuss the
persistent crime problem In African locations. (87)
• f :
Local civil guards were often set up by township residents to
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combat tsotsl crime. In Orlando West in 1947 a local citizens'
patrol was established, consisting of about 70 volunteers. The
police refused to give these civil patrols official recognition.
(88) In the early 50s, a civilian guard was established in
Sophiatown, which temporarily wiped out tsotsi crime. (89) In
1955 several advisory board members from throughout the Rand
claimed that the police were unable to control crime. Only during
periods of organised civil guards, they claimed, had location crime
been under control. (90) Civilian guards generally dissolved
quickly. Guard duty was dangerous and arduous : civilian guards
could not survive for long periods without official.support and
assistance. The state never encouraged civilian guards because It
feared that it would not be able to control them. (91)
Township residents were prepared to co-operate with the authorities
in order to combat location crime. In December 1947 thousands of
residents from Pimvllle, Sophiatown and Orlando flocked to a
meeting with the Deputy Commissioner of Police to discuss the Issue
of crime. Residents and the authorities agreed to co-operate in
order to wipe out street crime. (92)
Tsotsl crime, then, was a major township issue. It caused
divisions in African society, which hampered the efforts of
township residents to present a united front against the state
during crucial political and subsistence struggles In the 1940s and
1950s. Tsotsl culture was so pervasive amongst urban African youth
that local initiatives at crime prevention often took the form of
generational conflict. (93)
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By the early 1950s the state, both local and central, became
Increasingly anxious about the youth problem on the Rand. It
recognised that welfare organisations were Inadequate to cope with
the problem. Large scale state intervention was needed.
The de . -Villiers Louw Commission of 1950, which was appointed to
i
investigate acts of African violence in Krugersdorp, Newclare,
Randfontein and Newlands, identified youth gangs as major catalysts
of violence in all these locations. (94) In 1951, the
Inter-departmental Committee on Native Juvenile Unemployment was
established. This committee was aimed at investigating the extent
of, and the reasons for, Juvenile unemployment on the Rand and in
Pretoria. The committee established that there were direct links
between juvenile unemployment and "tsotsisra". (95) The central
state apparently identified African juvenile unemployment, which
led to "tsotsism", as politically threatening. Following the
Vlljoen Report, the central state showed tremendous interest in
finding employment for African youths on the Rand. It attempted to
provide the Johannesburg municipal government with active
assistance in this regard. In February 1953 The Director of Native
Labour and representatives from the Central Labour Bureau met with
local state officials to discuss the issue. Central government
officials called for greater co-ordination between local and
central state. (96) The central state was eager to handle the
problem in a forceful way. It offered assistance to local labour
bureaux wherever possible. In May 1953 the Director of Native
Labour sent a letter to the Johannesburg Native Commissioner
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offering central state assistance:
Hoewel die lndiensplasing van jond (sic) stedellke
Naturelle in die eerste plek die funksle van
plaaslike aarbeldsburo's is, versoek die
Departement distriks amptenare om plaaslike besture
in alle moontlike opsigte te help, ten elnde te
verseker dat die groot vraagstuk van stedelike
jeugwerklooshoold op kragdadidge (sic) wyse
aangepak word. (97)
The central government was convinced that the tsotsl problem could
best be combatted through overcoming African Juvenile unemployment.
H.S.J. Van Wyk, the Secretary of Native Affairs, In a letter to the
Johannesburg Director of Native Affairs In 1954, said explicitly
that "die lndiensplasing van Jeugdlge Naturelle [is] een van die
belangrlkste stappe om tsotsllsme te bestry ...'. In the same
letter he went on to argue that most young men were eager to enter
the job market "Derhalwe was werkverskaffing nog altyd as die
eerste en belangrlkste middel ter bestyding van die
tsotsi-vraagstuk beskou'. (98) In the same year Dr P. van
Rensburg, of the Native Affairs Department, Pretoria, told The
Star that 'juvenile unemployment had become a big social problem
and this idleness led to tsotsism". (99)
At the 1953 meeting between local and central government labour
officials, the state decided to embark on a three-pronged strategy,
based largely on the recommendations of the Viljoen Report, to
combat Juvenile unemployment on the Rand. First,
... it was the Intention of the Minister of Labour
to grant to those industries employing Juveniles
exemption from the various wage Instruments to
allow of (sic) the payment of a lower wage than
that applicable to adults. (100)
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It was hoped that more local juveniles would be employed if Wage
Board instruments were removed. Second, the Department of Labour
. committed itself to exploring avenues for juvenie employment in
commerce and industry "... and to endeavour to persuade commerce
and industry to give preference in filling such vacancies to
location youths in preference to youths from the rural areas or
Native Territories'. (101) Finally, the central government
Intended to place the allocation of Jobs on the Rand more firmly
under Central Labour Bureau control. All workseekers had to be
officially registered at the local labour bureaux which, in turn,
had ' to supply the Central Labour Bureau with regular reports on job
registration and job placement. This fitted into the Central
Labour Bureau's plan to screen out illegal migrant workseekers and
encourage the employment of urban juveniles. (102)
In mid 1953, the Johannesburg Department of Nativ.e Affairs launched
a juvenile employment drive. Initially, they had some success.
Between September 1953 and April 1954, 17 987 African juveniles (16
to 21 years of age) were registered as unemployed. 15 197 found
employment. (103) The official surplus was only 2 790, but of
course thousands of youths managed to avoid registraion. (104) The
figures for 1955 showed a marked increase In the official surplus.
Between February and October 1955, 38 695 urban juveniles were
officially registered as workseekers. 23 396 were placed in
employment. A balance of 15 299 failed to find employment. (105)
These figures probably indicate a tightening up of registration
procedures between April 1954 and February 1955, rather than a.
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deterioration in juvenile employment over this period. In fact,
the number of job placements was significantly higher during 1955.
Nevertheless, the Secretary of Native Affairs, Van Rensburg, was
angry and perplexed about the 1955 juvenile unemployment figures.
He demanded an explanation and more details from the Johannesburg
Registration Officer. (106)
It seems likely that the state's need to curb the tsotsl gangs
contributed to the general tightening up of influx control in the
early 1950s. Youth gangs seriously hampered the state"s ability to
control the townships. Moreover, the authorities strongly
suspected that youth gangs could become dangerous political tools
of the liberation movement. (107) Throughout the 1940s, even under
National Party leadership after 1948, the state never seriously
challenged industrialists in the FWV area who employed workers from
the rural areas. More accurately, local government turned a blind
eye to those employment practices. The central state lacked the
resources to intervene directly. Municipal governments in the PWV
came under pressure from the Department of Native Affairs to
tighten up on influx control but were generally able to resist this
pressure. When tsotsl gangs started to present a serious control
problem in the townships In the early 1950s, municipal governments
started to clamp down on the influx of rural workseekers. In
Johannesburg, the central state also took firmer control over the
municipal Council's influx control practices. The state encouraged
local Industrialists to absorb the available pool of local juvenile
labour. (108) It hoped that this would curb the growth of tsotsl
gangs. Tsotsls, it seems, were a big enough issue to influence
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Influx control strategies In the 1950s.
Ill
Tsotsls and The Congress Youth League
•Youth gangs', comments Bonner, "were street-wise, anti-social and
suspicious, but they represented a potentially powerful political
resource for any aspiring political leader'. (109) According to
Mphahlele and Motlana, the political potential of these street
)
gangs was minimal. "Basically they were out for themselves ...
They had to learn how to survive and make a living and also to
create a power structure of some kind in the crime world". The
gangs had little interest in politics. (110)
The authorities, however, were convinced that tsotsls were
mobilized politically. The de Vllllers Louw Commission provided
evidence of youth gang Involvement in political activities. During
the Newlands tram boycott of August-September 1949, for instance,
"tramway officials reported ... that Native youths were stoning all
tram cars". Youths apparently assaulted several Newlands residents
who attempted to use the trams. (Ill) In October 1949, riots broke
out in Krugersdorp in response to police liquor raids and the
extension of passes to women. Here, too, the Commission was
convinced of youth gang involvement:
The clearest evidence was placed before the
Commission that organized gangs of youths took a
leading part in acts of violence during the riots.
They acted in concert and achieved definite results
... No evidence was adduced as to whether these
youths had leaders who Instructed them but evidence
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generally seemed to point to tsotsl gangs - gangs
of youths who propogate lawlessness and disorder.
(103)
The Commission then went on, Inevitably, to attribute these acts of
violence to communist Instigation. Communists "clandestinely and
In places of vantage urged Irresponsible youths and scholars to
acts of violence'. (J.13)
There Is some evidence that youths were Involved In similar kinds
of political intimidatory activities throughout the' 1950s. (114)
During the 1950 May Day Stayaway, for Instance, youths carried out
reprisals against boycott breakers and, "standing on the roofs of
the Orlando shelters, youths pelted passing trains with stones".
(115) Clearly, then, tsotsis did Involve themselves In political
activities. But could they be politically mobilised? Bonner
comments:
Would-be moblllsers had to strike a responsive
chord in the collective consciousness of the gangs,
and this was not necessarily easily accomplished by
the intelligentsia leading most of the political
groups. The most effective moblllsers were
predictably those who were schooled in street
culture themselves. (116)
The Congress Youth League saw.Itself as a mass youth movement and,
on an official level, expressed Interest in linking up with every
type of youth organisation. In its 1944 Manifesto the CYL stated
that it would be "a co-ordinating agency for all youthful forces
employed in rousing popular political consciousness and fighting
oppression ...'. It committed Itself "to win over and persuade
other Youth organizations to come over to the A.N.C.Y.L." (117) In
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an official document published in June 1954, the CYL reiterated Its
commitment to establish contact with as many youth organisations as
possible.
Where such bodies already exist it Is our task to
co-operate with, strengthen and give guidance to
such bodies. Branches should keep personal and
active contact with all established Youth
Organisations in their locations. (118)
To what extent did the CYL carry out this commitment? Were tsotsl
gangs even recognized as 'Youth Organisations'?
Bonner provides the best evidence to date of co-operation between
the CYL and youth gangs. (119) His evidence is based on the oral
testimony of a certain *AB". AB was involved In youth gangs
throughout the 1940s and early 1950s. AB was an exceptional
tsotsl in that he took education seriously. He studied at night
school and In 1946 he was employed by a Benonl attorney. He became
a widely respected youth gang leader on the East Rand, largely as a
result of his leading role In anti-Indian violence. In the early
1950s AB was apparently approached by a prominent ANC leader, who
recognised AB's leadership qualities and drew him into the local
CYL branch. He soon moved Into a leadership position in the Benoni
CYL. (120) AB was In a unique position of having contacts in both
the youth underworld and the educated political elite.
AB was able to convince several Benoni gangs of the importance of
political Involvement, and proceeded to draw them into the ANC.
AB ... brought his gangs firmly within the orbit of
the ANC and they provided the shock troops for much
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of the rest of the decade. Operating under the
name of Thaka Enyane (Young Black Soldiers) they
were mobilised into roost of the AKC's later
campaigns. Between 1953 and 1955 the ANC in Benonl
became rejuvenated. (121)
AB's gangs were heavily involved In the 1954 Bantu Education
boycott In Benoni. In April 1954, they were active in preventing
children from attending school. The Bantu Education boycott was
particularly successful in Benonl. "AB, the Youth League and the
youth gangs were at the centre of its organisation". (122) AB was
eventually deported but youth gangs continued . to operate
effectively within the ANC in Benoni until 1960.
Despite this evidence of CYL-youth gang co-operation in Benoni, the
CYL never made any formal contact with youth gangs. (123) While
Motlana was secretary of the Youth League, from late 1949 until
1952, no official approaches were made to the gangs. "No attempt
was made to get at them and ... redirect their ways. Xn those days
we just regarded them as criminals". (124) In fact, the issue was
never openly discussed at Youth League meetings or placed on
meeting agendas. (125) Mphahlele and Motlana, however, were aware
of occasional informal individualised contact between the CYL and
gangs. (126) Pitje also acknowledged that contact may well have
been .made at the branch level "without his realizing It". (127)
Motlana knew of incidents in which CYL members approached
individual tsotsls and attempted to "change their ways". (128)
Mphahlele recalls that indviduals were occasionally informally
criticized within the ANC and CYL for "meddling with tsotsls" in
the early 1950s. Most ANC members recoiled from the idea "because
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[tsotsls] couldn't be controlled ...'. (129)
In 1952, some young unemployed youths, often with tsotsl
connections, did get involved in the Defiance Campaign. (130) The
CYL made some localized attempts to link up to youth gangs during
the Defiance Campaign. "There was an attempt to recruit them'.
Branch leadership spoke to gang leaders but, although a few
individuals were recruited, success was "minimal*. Whatever
contacts were made during the Defiance Campaign were not sustained.
They,seemed to "peter out". (131)
According to Mphahlele and Hotlana, the ANC's most sustained
attempt to politicize gangs occurred during the 1954 Sophiatown
removals. CYL activists went out to woo these gangs consciously.
.i
Branch level leaders certainly saw some potential in mobilising
these gangs against the removals. Robert Resha, a member of the
CYL executive, spoke to several Sophiatown gang leaders at the
time. There was a certain amount of co-operation between the CYL
and gangs during the removals but the alliance was a transient one.
The gangs were never really politicised, they were "a whole lot of
undisciplined youth" who recognised a temporary convergence of
interests between themselves and the Youth League. (132)
Prior to 1954 Youth League activists in Sophiatown actually
participated in the establishment of a local civil guard aimed at
combatting tsotsl activity. Crime was a major concern of older
generation township residents in the early 1950s. Motlana and
Resha helped to organise the civil guard, which was led by a man
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named Mathebe. Vigilantes patrolled the streets regularly. Crime
was temporarily removed from the Sophlatown streets. (133)
Interestingly, then. Youth League activists saw crime as an
important local issue. Clearly, they abandoned their youth
constituency in Sophiatown. Instead of trying to redirect local
tsotsls into political, more socially orientated, activities,
Hotlana and Resha joined forces with the older generation residents
in their attempt to crush tsotsls. Tsotsls were not considered
as potential political allies in Sophiatown until the 1954
removals. Although the CYL recognised that the social'environment
was responsible for crime in the locations, the most coherent stand
It took on the crime issue was to complain that the South African
Police were not taking strong enough action against tsotsls.
(134) Pitje, Motlana and Mphahlele all confirm that tsotsls often
involved themselves Informally In ANC campaigns. During the West
Native Township, Sophiatown and Martlndale tram boycotts, for
Instance, tsotsls 'could be trusted to board a tram and beat up
those who were on the tram and in that way help to make the tram
boycotts more effective'. (135) According to Motlana, elements of
unemployed youths would often form the "storm troopers" of boycott
campaigns and stayaways. (136) But they all stress that tsotsl
Involvement was spontaneous. Tsotsis obviously Identified closely
with certain campaign issues and took their own Initiatives to
enforce adherence to boycotts. The Youth League never consciously
attempted to organise tsotsls as "storm troopers".
The general failure to politicise youth gangs can be attributed
both to the anti-social nature of tsotsl culture and to the
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Inability and unwillingness of the CYL intelligentsia to organise
youth gangs. The CYL operated in a different cultural framework
from that of the youth gangs. Tsotsls were identified as
anti-social, a-political, aggressive outsiders. AB was an
exceptional Youth League leader. Becaue he had grown up as a
" • ••'(
tsotsl, he was able 'to strike a responsive chord in the collective
i ;
consciousness of the gangs'. AB's story certainly demonstrates the
political potential of youth gangs in the 1950s. Their sporadic
and spontaneous Involvement in political campaigns suggests an
••, awareness of, and an interest in, political issues. Gangs had to
I: be mobilised and redirected sensitively. AB showed that it was
possible. The main body of the CYL, however, preferred to
concentrate its activities amongst school students, a youth
constituency which was much smaller than those youths who were
situated broadly within the tsotsl cultural framework.
I - -
Conclusion
The CYL appealed to a relatively small constituency. They made
little headway amongst the uneducated and semi-literate sections of
the urban African population. Congress Mbata, one of the founding
members of the CYL, acknowledged this.
... looking back at it now of course we Inevitably
quite unconsciously concentrated on people with
education and the tone and perhaps content of our
manifesto - one thinks now It couldn't have meant
much to the masses at the time. It was good to
speak of Africa for the Africans but the man in the
street would say well yes, Africa for the Africans,
so what? And we didn't have the answer to that 'so
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what?1 (137)
The CYX made an Impact on a limited section of "the younger
people*. Motlana concedes that the CYL's appeal was largely
confined to well-read students. The Ol's political ideology 'was
high-falutin, high class stuff, intellectual stuff. Very
attractive to young students like ourselves but improbably didn't
seep through to the ordinary workers'. Motlana, assessing the
CYL's impact amongst semi-literate and unemployed youths, comments:
... the movement, I think one can say honestly,
did not reach out to the ordinary young people who.,
left school, who, did not receive any education at
all, who did not read the Rand Daily Mall ... (138)
Apart from AB's individual success story in Benonl, the Rand youth
gangs remained largely isolated from African Nationalist politics
during the 1940s and 1950s. It is probable tha.t the Communist
Party made some attempts to mobilise the gangs politically, but
more research needs to be done in this area. (139) The youth gangs
were not entirely a-political. It is clear that they had at least
some political potential. A co-ordinated and culturally sensitive
attempt was required by political movements . to utilise this
potential. " ' ' '
 ; . •
 :
Today, township youths are extraordinarily politicised and
militant. • Not only are they politicised but they have tendedj to
align themselves closely with national political movements. In
fact, it is safe to say that youths are the key political actors in
contemporary South African politics, youth congresses have emerged
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throughout the country which draw on support from youths across the
economic and educational spectrum. The scenario, then, is very
different from that of the 1940s and 1950s. Why is this? What has
happened during the last two or three decades to bring about such a
radical change in urban African youth culture?
One possible explanation lies in the massive growth of Bantu
Education. In 1960 about 46 000 Africans attended secondary school
across the country. By 1970 this figure had risen to about 122 000
and by 1980, a startling 577 000 Africans attended secondary
school. In 1984, there were just over one million African high
school students, nationwide. (140) Bantu Education had two
important effects. First, schooling became much more available to
African youths. Second, African schooling was brought under
tighter state control. The quantitative expansion of schooling was
not matched by a qualitative improvement in educational standards.
African schooling became widely discredited amongst students.
Under Bantu Education two distinct urban youth cultures were drawn
together in common defiance of the political order. Tsotsl culture
was marginalised in the 1960s as a result of more accessible
schooling as well as a massive state clampdown on Rand youth gangs
in the late 1950s and early 1960s. (141) Tsotsl culture became
more or less absorbed Into the schools. In the 1970s the potential
job market for school leavers contracted, thus compounding the
growing frustration of the school-going population.
The style of African youth politics today displays characteristics
of both the Youth League tradition and 1950s tsotsl culture. The
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CYX tradition infused modern youth politics with a national
movement and national programme orientation. Tsotsl culture, it
seems, has helped to infuse youth politics with an
anti-establishment aggression which, was virtually absent in 1950s
liberation politics.
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